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1 Introduction
The emergence of Covid-19 in 2020 as a major public health concern has prompted Governments
across the western world to adopt a number of extraordinary measures, unprecedented in peace-
time. While absolutely necessary from a health perspective, the cumulated impact of these
measures on national economies has resulted in unprecedented economic fallout with millions
of workers across Europe being made unemployed in a very short period of time. To mitigate
the negative impact of the pandemic, European Governments have initiated extraordinary fiscal
responses at a national level. These significant expenditure measures coupled with the expected
fall in taxation receipts due to the decline in economic activity will result in most countries
facing substantial fiscal challenges with key metrics such as the general Government balance and
debt to GDP ratios set to be adversely impacted. Given the likely scale of the challenge, a
number of commentators have called for a coordinated response at a European level to address
this impending fiscal crisis with Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020) providing a summary of
recommendations from noted contributors. There have already been a number of significant
policy developments in that regard. Most notably to date, in early May, the French and German
Governments proposed a €750 bn EU Commission fund to tackle the economic impact of Covid-
19. This proposal is innovative in that it allows the EU commission to borrow on its account
and so create a new class of EU bonds.
In this paper we have two main aims; the first is to examine the impact on the Irish economy
of the unfolding pandemic crisis and the second, given the increase in extraordinary expenditures
at national level, is to assess the role European institutions can play in mitigating the negative
demand and supply effects of the crisis for a particular member state by participating directly in
the sovereign debt management of that country. In doing so, we use a medium scale small open
economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (SOE-DSGE) model calibrated for Ireland that
has been developed in Varthalitis (2019).1
To conduct this exercise, we extend the model in three ways. First, we introduce demand and
supply shocks in the model so as to gauge the adverse impact of the pandemic in key macroeco-
nomic aggregates of a small open economy member of Eurozone. By now, most commentators
expect a significant economic fallout in Ireland see e.g. McQuinn et al. (2020).2 Second, we
develop the fiscal block of the model so as to incorporate a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments
that are used by national fiscal authorities to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic. Third,
and, perhaps more importantly, we study the impact of European institutions directly interven-
ing in the debt management of a member state economy. This is accomplished by enhancing a
SOE model to add a union-wide policymaker that can directly intervene in the debt management
of the domestic economy.
In particular, under our policy experiment, we assume that two policy authorities can inter-
vene in the small open economy member of a currency union. The national fiscal authority (the
treasury) and a supra-national foreign policymaker (EU institutions). The role of the national
fiscal authority is to finance its government expenditure, conventional and extraordinary, by levy-
ing taxes and/or issuing sovereign bonds. The role of EU institutions, under our experiment,
is to buy sovereign bonds from the member states and set the union-wide interest rate policy.
Thus, each member state public debt can now be held by two types of institutional creditors,
namely private markets and EU institutions. Therefore, EU policy can generate additional fis-
cal space for the national governments in the short to medium run. The timing of when these
1FIR-GEM is a small open economy DSGE model for Ireland. Since the structure of the model is thoroughly
analysed in Varthalitis (2019) in this paper we mostly focus on the extensions and the policy implications.
2Figures in McQuinn et al. (2020) are in line with estimates in IFAC, Fiscal Assessment Report (May 2020),
IMF World Economic Outlook for Ireland (see IMF WEO 2020) and European Commission (May 2020), Central
Bank of Ireland (April 2020).
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bonds will start impacting domestic public finances depends on the purchasing policy of the EU
institution.3
In terms of the impact of the pandemic shock, we consider two possible outcomes. One
outcome involves the impacts of the outbreak fading swiftly with economic activity, as a conse-
quence, recovering quite quickly. We refer to as the "v-shaped" recovery. We also consider an
outcome where the pandemic endures and, thus, the adverse effects on the economy are more
prolonged. This is referred to as the "long-lasting" outcome.
Our results indicate that the direct financial assistance of the EU institutions via sovereign
bonds purchases increases the effi ciency of the extraordinary national fiscal stimulus packages.
A fiscal stimulus at the national level backed by EU financing reduces the output losses in the
first year which would otherwise occur. The reduction in the output loss ranges from 0.8 per
cent to 1.4 per cent depending on the mix of fiscal policies chosen by the member state. The
cumulative reduction in output loss over a five year horizon could sum to 2.5 per cent to 4.1
per cent depending on the fiscal policy mix chosen. In terms of national policy, we find that
extraordinary expenditures such as spending related to enhance public health, labour income
subsidies and/or cash transfers targeted to financially constrained households perform better in
countering the negative impacts of the recession. Fiscal packages should target households with
no other sources of income and, thus, with a higher propensity to consume. We also conduct
sensitivity analysis. Our paper contributes to the growing literature that extends medium scale
DSGE models used for policy analysis to study macroeconomic and policy implications of the
pandemic, see e.g. Bayer et al. (2020) and Faria-e-Castro (2020) who focus on closed economy
models and Hagedorn and Mitman (2020) who discuss the role of the ECB through the lens of
a HANK model. We study these issues in a small open economy model where the country is a
member of a currency union.4 We think that our key findings provide a basis for the proposals
summarized in section 2 below.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in section 2 we summarize the debate on the role
that could be played by EU institutions. Section 3 and 4 develops the extensions and calibrates
the model. Section 5 presents the main scenarios simulated. Section 6 explains our results and
sections 7 conducts sensitivity analysis. Section 8 outlines some concluding comments. An online
Appendix provides technical details.
2 Increased role for EU institutions in sharing the debt of
member states?
The inevitable pressure that the emergence of Covid-19 will place on the public finances of
countries across European has raised once again the issue of whether European institutions
should provide more support to member states incurring significant fiscal diffi culties. In the
present context a number of different options have been advanced. Blanchard (2020), for example,
has called for the ECB to act directly and buy Italian bonds. Whelan (2020) has endorsed the
proposal by Gros and Mayer (2012) that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should be
provided with a liquidity backstop by having it registered as a bank.
Alesina and Giavazzi (2020) have called for the ECB to lift, temporarily, the constraints on
its asset purchase program and in particular the capital key. Furthermore, they suggest that the
additional expenditure required by member states to address the Covid-19 issue should be part
3Arguably, the most likely manifestation of the policy experiment assessed is the direct purchase by the ECB
of Government bonds. The ECB are already likely to purchase €15 to €20 billion of Irish debt in 2020 on the
secondary market.
4Hagedorn and Mitman (2020) discuss the role of the ECB through the lens of the HANK model.
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of an EU program. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2020) and Gourinchas (2020) both support a massive
debt-financed fiscal stimulus at the European level.
In our exercise, it is not our intention to recommend the most effective or preferable form of
European intervention but to demonstrate the impact a particular form of intervention would
have on the recovery path of the Irish economy.
3 The model
Our model is similar to the medium scale small open economy DSGE developed in Varthalitis
(2019). We extend the model in the following ways: first, we allow for the negative demand
and supply effect of the pandemic in the small open economy of a member state of the EU.
Second, we develop the fiscal block of the model so as to incorporate a set of extraordinary
fiscal instruments that are used by national fiscal authorities to mitigate the negative effect of
the pandemic. Third, we allow for a greater policy role of EU institutions in providing financial
assistance to an individual member state. We refer to Varthalitis (2019) for certain technical
aspects of the model.
3.1 Households
There are two type of households. Ricardian households (or Savers) indexed by r and non
Ricardians (or Non Savers) indexed by nr. Ricardian households solve a standard maximization



















subject to the sequential budget constraint:
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worked, gross investment, the beginning-of-period physical capital, the real return of capital,





the real value of the end-of-period domestic government bonds and internationally traded assets
respectively, St is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of one unit of
foreign currency, Rt−1, Qt−1 ≥ 1 denote the gross nominal return of domestic government bonds
and international assets between t− 1 and t respectively, τ ct , τnt , τkt are consumption, labour and
capital tax rates respectively, τ l,rt is conventional public transfers targeted to Ricardian household
r. Borrowing on the international market entails an adjustment cost Φ∗ (f∗rt , f
∗r).
To model the impacts of the pandemic, we follow Eichenbaum et al. (2020) and introduce the
term µctPtc
r
t so as to proxy the negative effect on consumption from containment policies aimed
at reducing social interactions. In normal times, µct = 0, while during the pandemic, µ
c
t > 0.




t measures productivity of labour in the different sectors of






t ). During normal times, φt = 1,
which means that the household supply their full capacity of hours worked across all sectors of
the economy. In the case of a pandemic, φt < 1, because some members of the households are
infected and/or cannot work due to the restrictive measures.
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In response to the pandemic, the Government launches a set of extraordinary spending in-
struments to alleviate the negative economic effects. We assume that these spending instruments
are: first, spending related to public health, ght .We assume that this type of spending is a strong
complement to private consumption. The parameter, ϑg < 0, measures the degree of comple-
mentarity between private consumption and this type of public spending. The economic logic
of this assumption is that the extreme containment measures curtail a large part of consump-
tion activities. Households will only be able to restore their levels of private consumption if
the Government can guarantee a certain level of safety while goods are being consumed. Public
good/services, ght , captures the extraordinary public expenditures that can restore a certain level
of private consumption in the short run. As such this expenditure can be thought of as a strong
complement to private consumption.
Second, τ covid,rt is an income subsidy which is proportional to the loss of income experienced
in the private sector. That is, the Government pays back a fraction, τ covid,rt , of the income losses
occured during the pandemic. Due to the nature of the pandemic shock and the extraordinary
nature of these subsidies aimed at curtailing the income loss, we assume that households do not
internalize τ covid,rt in their labour supply decisions. Third, Ptτ
cash,r
t , denotes direct extraordinary
cash transfers. We model the exogenous effect of the pandemic in Ricardians and non-Ricardians
to be symmetric.Non-Ricardian households (non-Savers) receive income from working in the trad-
able, non-tradable and public sectors; but they have no access to capital or/and financial markets.
Similarly with Ricardians households the extraordinary spending instruments can benefit non
Ricardians. To account for targeted fiscal policies to different income classes, we allow income
subsidies and cash transfers to differ between Ricardian and Non-Ricardian households. Details
are available in the online Appendix.
3.2 Policy
We now extend Varthalitis (2019) by allowing national fiscal policy to use an extraordinary set
of spending instruments in a discretionary manner (see section 3.2.4) while we allow for an
enhanced role of the EU institutions (see section 3.2.5).
3.2.1 Institutional composition of public debt
Following Economides et al. (2020),5 we assume that Ireland’s public debt can be purchased by
two types of creditors that differ in their institutional state: (i) private markets, i.e. domestic
and foreign agents that participate in the domestic and international financial markets and (ii)








where PtFMt ≡ PtBt+StP ∗t F
∗g
t denotes public debt in private markets and is further decomposed
in public debt held by domestic private agents, PtBt, and foreign private agents, StP ∗t F
∗g
t . In





debt that is purchased by EU institutions and it will be referred as EU-held public debt. Below,
we assume that each type of public debt incurs different borrowing costs as well as entails different
implications for the domestic country’s public finances.
5This modelling choice is motivated by Irish data on Irish public debt holders, e.g. Larkin et al. (2019) in
Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin (Q2, 2019) estimate that 29% of Irish public debt was held by EU
institutions at the end of 2018.
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3.2.2 Borrowing cost and type of institutional creditor
We assume that the borrowing cost faced by the small open economy depends on the institutional
state of the creditor. In terms of public debt in private markets, we assume that the interest


















where Q∗t denotes the union-wide interest rate, ψ
d is a parameter which measures the elasticity
of the interest rate with respect to deviations of the market-held public debt to GDP ratio from
its threshold value, FM .
In terms of public debt purchased by EU institutions, we assume that the EU can lend to
a member state at an interest rate lower than the one the member would face in the private
markets, i.e. Q∗t < Qt. Since it depends on the economic fundamentals and policies of the
currency union (e.g. the interest rate policy of the ECB). As noted in Reis (2016) in the absence
of any sovereign risk premium the two type of bonds are equivalent. However, the higher the
sovereign risk due to higher debt held by private markets (or other reasons captured in ψd) the
larger the importance of the institutional type of the creditor.
3.2.3 Government Budget Constraint







































market-held public debt held by domestic and foreign (non-Irish residents) households respec-
tively. StP ∗t F
∗EU
t is public debt held by EU institutions. We assume that the Government has
two sets of spending instruments the conventional nominal government spending, PtGt, which
includes non-utility enhancing government consumption, Gct , investment, G
i
t, the public wage







PtGt ≡ PtGct + PtGit + PtGwt − PtT lt (5)
and a set of extraordinary spending instruments, PtGcovidt . The latter includes labour income
subsidies,τ covid,r and τ covid,nr, direct cash transfers, τ cash,rt and τ
cash,nr
t , targeted to Ricardians
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Furthermore, PtTt are total nominal tax revenues. The government generates tax revenues
by levying consumption, labour and capital taxes:































































Thus, the national fiscal policymaker has seven conventional fiscal policy instruments and
five extraordinary spending instruments at their disposal. In our experiments, we assume that
market-held public debt, FMt , is adjusted residually to satisfy the government budget constraint
in each period t; while the EU Institutions determine the supply of EU-purchased public debt,
F ∗EUt as well as the interest rate paid on this debt Q
∗
t (see section 3.2.5). Ireland is a member
of a currency union; thus we solve for a monetary regime without monetary independence and a
fixed exchange rate regime. For simplicity, we normalize the nominal depreciation rate, StSt−1 , to
unity.
3.2.4 National Fiscal Policy
Conventional fiscal policy instruments Domestic fiscal policymakers set the seven conven-
tional policy instruments according to the following simple fiscal rules:



























is the vector of the seven national fiscal policy instru-
ments and f is the vector with the associated policy targets which are set equal to their steady
state values. The conventional spending instruments are expressed as output ratios. ρf ∈ [0, 1)
are autoregressive coeffi cients that capture fiscal persistence, γf are the feedback policy coef-
ficients that measure the magnitude of the policy reaction to the market-held public debt to
output ratio (more details in Appendix E).
We assume that the national fiscal authorities use one or more fiscal instruments to only react
to public debt held by private markets. This assumption implies that, in the short run, the EU
funded public debt does not impose an extra fiscal burden on the member state’s public finances.
This could be thought as a policy in which EU policymakers suspends the stringency of the
fiscal targets amid the pandemic crisis. Thus, it creates additional fiscal space for national fiscal
policymakers to adjust their public finances in an attempt to mitigate the negative economic
effects of Covid-19.
On the other hand, it should be noticed that public debt held by EU institutions enters the
government budget constraint (see equation 4), thus, eventually, it will result in a fiscal cost.
That is, in the medium/long run, the EU funded debt should be financed either by the issuance
of new public debt in the private markets or by future fiscal adjustment (i.e. tax increases and/or
spending decreases). The timing of this depends on the EU policy which is specified in the next
section.
Extraordinary fiscal instruments To deal with the unprecedented nature of the shock na-
tional fiscal policymakers use a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments. The fiscal authority sets
these instruments in a discretionary manner for the specific time period in which the economy
is especially affected by the pandemic.
3.2.5 EU Institutions
In our model, however, we assume that EU institutions can utilize two policy instruments to
intervene in managing the debt levels of a member state’s economy, namely the union-wide
interest rate, Q∗t , and sovereign bonds holdings, F
∗EU
t .
6In terms of sovereign bonds holdings,
6For thorough discussion and modelling of the alternative instruments available at the Eurosystem see Econo-
mides et al. (2020) and references therein.
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following Sims and Wu (2020), we assume that EU institutions purchases of sovereign bonds are
set according to a Taylor-type reaction function:
F ∗EUt − F ∗EU = ρF
∗EU (














is the share of the public deficit7 to output deviation from a target, def , that EU
insitutions finance via EU bond holdings, ρF
∗EU
, capture the speed with which these bonds could
be reduced and εF
∗EU
t is an iid shock that captures discretionary sovereign bonds purchases by
the EU institutions.
The policy parameter γF
∗EU
governs the share of the domestic deficit to output ratio that EU
institutions allow to be financed via EU bond holdings in period t. The policy parameter ρF
∗EU
governs the duration of the EU purchasing programme. For example, a short-lived purchasing
programme, captured by a lower value of ρF
∗EU
, means that the member state that borrows
from EU institutions will need to generate additional resources in a quicker manner to meet its
financing needs, either by borrowing purely via private markets or by tax/spending adjustments.
3.3 Modelling the pandemic shock in a SOE-DSGE
It is widely accepted that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted economies as a combined supply
and demand shock (see e.g. Eichenbaum et al. (2020) and Fornaro and Wolf (2020)).






The outbreak of the pandemic in period 1 means that εµ
c
1 > 0; while the parameter ρ
µc1 measures
the persistence. In addition, on the demand side we implement a negative shock to the demand
from the rest of the world for Irish exports. Following Varthalitis (2019) we assume that the
demand for exports, xt, is given by:
xt = ρ






where, ρx, is a parameter that governs the persistence of exports, x are exports in the steady





reflects that exports are also function of deviations in the terms of
trade8 from its steady state value.9The effect of the pandemic on exports is modelled as negative






1 + εφt (12)
The outbreak of the pandemic means that in period 1, εφ1 < 0; while ρ
φ measure the persistence
of the pandemic effects on labour supply.
7National public deficit in nominal terms is defined as, DEFt ≡ (Rt−1 − 1)λgt−1Pt−1FMt−1 +




Pt−1FMt−1 + PtGt + PtG
covid
t − PtTt, i.e. government spending minus tax revenues
plus the interest payments on market-held public debt.
8The terms of trade are defined as the price of exports with respect to the price of imports.
9The latter term ensures dynamic stability and allows exports to have an endogenous feedback from changes
in the relative price of Irish exports. Where, γx > 0, implies that an increase in the relative price of exports to
imports results in a decrease in the world demand for the home produced tradable good.
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4 Calibration
This section discusses the calibration of the model. For most of the structural parameters of the
model we follow the calibration strategy developed in Varthalitis (2019). More details can be
found in Table E.1 in the Appendix G. Here, we focus on the parameters that are important for
our experiments. Tables 1 and 2 present the key structural parameters and policy parameters
respectively.
Table 1: Key structural parameter values
Parameter Implied Value Description
ϑg −1 complementarity between private consumption
and public spending related to public health
ψd 0.015
sovereign risk premium coeffi cient




persistence of the ad hoc cost
in private consumption
ρφ 0.2 (0)
persistence of the labour
supply shock
ρx 0.2 (0)
persistence of the shock
of the RoW demand for exports
Table 2:Policy parameter values
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that determines the share
of the national deficit to output ratio
financed by EU institutions
def -0.01 Deficit to output target in EU rules
Parameters that govern the impact of the pandemic The set of parameters that govern
the persistence and the magnitude of the pandemic are set so as to generate a first year output
recession of -10.5 per cent in the long-lasting scenario. The magnitude of the output fallout is
within the ranges of the recession forecasted for Ireland by a number of policy institutions.
Sovereign risk premium The parameter that governs the sensitivity of the international
market interest rate to deviations of the market-held public debt from a threshold is set equal
10The threshold value is the average value of the market held public debt to GDP ratio between 2001-2018 and
also coincides with the limit imposed by the Maastricht Criteria for all EU countries.
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to 0.015. This value is consistent with recent empirical work on the Irish sovereign premium
(Cronin et al. (2018)).11
Policy Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the national fiscal policymaker uses the
conventional government consumption, sg,ct , to react to market-held public debt deviations from
its target. By setting, γs
g,c
, equal to 0.07 which is the lowest value for which we get dynamic
stability. Furthermore, in what follows when we assume that the EU institutions do not intervene






= 0 in equation (9). On the other
hand, when we allow EU institutions to intervent in the member state economy these feedback
policy coeffi cients are set equal to ρF
∗EU
= 0.99 and γF
∗EU
= 1 (more details in section ??).
5 Scenarios analysis
We assume two different recovery outcomes for the Irish economy. A v-shaped recovery, where
the economy is expected to recover quite quickly and a long-lasting outcome, where the negative
effects of the pandemic endure for a longer period
5.1 Policy responses
The Government is assumed to utilize the set of a extraordinary fiscal instruments specified in
section 3.2.4 above in a discretionary manner to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic.
Initially, we examine the impact of one fiscal instrument at a time in order to quantify the effects
on output of each fiscal instrument separately (normalized to 1% of steady state output). Two
alternative public financing scenarios of these extraordinary fiscal packages are now considered.
First, via private markets where the emerging public deficits are financed by an increase in
market-held public debt at the market interest rate. Second, we allow EU institutions to provide
financial assistance to member states in the form of purchases of government bonds.
6 Results
6.1 Pandemic impact on the Irish economy
Figure 1 presents the dynamic responses of the key endogenous macroeconomic variables under
the two recovery outcomes based on the "v-shaped" and the "long-lasting" recovery.
On the demand side, due to the administrative closedowns and the higher risk of becoming
infected households reduce consumption sharply in the short-run. Similarly, the rest of the world
reduces its demand for Irish goods and services resulting in a large reduction in domestic exports.
On the supply side, the pandemic shock causes a substantial fall in hours worked. Subsequently,
the large decrease in hours worked and consumption will also reduce investment. As a result,
the combined negative impact of demand and supply causes a significant reduction in output.
As expected, the combined effects of these shocks have significant implications for key fiscal
metrics. The large drop in demand and supply leads to a drop in wages and returns on capital
across sectors. As a result, the tax bases of the economy which consists of consumption and
income from labour and capital are expected to experience a significant fall. Accordingly, there
is a sharp rise in the national deficit. In figure 1, we assume that the deficit is financed by
an increase in borrowing via private markets. Thus, the public debt held by private markets
11 In a recent analysis, McQuinn (2020) using several variants of the empirical model in Cronin et al. (2018)
have estimated that this parameter varies from 0.005 to 0.025 using Irish data over the period 2000-2019.
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increases and this puts upward pressure on the sovereign premia. The rise in real interest rates
feeds back into the economy and further suppresses investment and consumption.
Figure 1: Duration of the pandemic shock and impact on the Irish economy

































Market-held Debt to GDP





Sovereign spread (Real terms)
v-shaped
long-lasting
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, endogenous variables are in % from their steady
state values; Market-held public debt, deficit to GDP and sovereign premia in real
terms are ratios and rate respectively.
6.2 The role of policy
In Table 1 we quantify the implications of the extraordinary national fiscal policy measures on
output levels in the first year by varying the fiscal policy instrument (2nd-4th rows) used to
alleviate the negative effect as well as the method of public financing these extraordinary fiscal
packages (3rd-4th columns).
In the first column of Table 1, we report which fiscal instrument is used to deal with the
economic fallout. In particular, the fiscal instruments which are utilized are additional spending
in "public health", cash transfers targeted at financially constrained households, labour income
subsidies targeted at financially constrained households and a spending fiscal mix of these items.
For comparison, the size of fiscal stimulus in each case is normalized to 1 per cent of steady state
output while in the case of the spending mix sums to 3 per cent of steady state output.
The results under the two scenarios of public financing are presented in the third and fourth
column. In particular, the results when the Government borrows from private markets are
presented in the third column of Table 1. The results when EU institutions provide financial
assistance in the form of purchases of sovereign bonds are presented in the fourth column. In
the second column, the results for when there is no policy intervention at either national or
supranational level are also presented.12
12For comparability, across all three scenarios, the Government uses conventional government consumption to
react of market-held public debt so as to ensure fiscal sustainability.
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Table 1: First year output recession under various policy scenarios





ght -10.5% -9.9% -8.7%
τ cash,nrt -10.5% -10.4% -9.3%
τ covid,nrt -10.5% -10.3% -9.5%
Spending mix -10.5% -9.8% -8.4%
In terms of mitigating the negative impact on output, the most effective instrument is spend-
ing associated with public health, followed by a targeted fiscal policy which supports the income
of non Savers either via labour income subsidies or direct cash transfers. The least effective fiscal
instruments are labour income subsidies and cash transfers targeted at Savers.13 However, the
mitigation effect is quantitatively small in most of the cases when these extraordinary fiscal mea-
sures are financed solely via newly issued public debt in the private markets (see the explanation
below).
In contrast, when EU institutions actively engage in sovereign bonds purchases the effect
of the extraordinary national fiscal measures increases significantly across all fiscal instruments
(compare the third and fourth column). In particular, increasing spending related to public health
by 1 per cent of GDP could reduce the output loss by 1.2 per cent more when EU institutions
provide financial assistance, i.e. from 9.9 per cent to 8.7 per cent. Similarly, increases in direct
cash transfers and labour income subsidies targeted to Non-Ricardians/Non-Savers backed by
EU purchased bonds could reduce the output loss by 1.1 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively.
In terms of the spending mix, EU purchased sovereign bonds mitigate the recession by 1.4 per
cent.
Finally, the EU institutions sovereign bonds purchasing programme could enable a quicker
recovery of the economy. In particular, the cumulative reduction in output loss over a five
year horizon sum to 2.49 per cent, 2.98 per cent, 2.77 per cent and 4.1 per cent for the direct
cash transfers, labour income subsidies, spending related to public health and the spending mix
respectively (see computations in Appendix I).
6.3 The underlying mechanism
Now, we examine the mechanism by which the intervention of EU institutions can help to mitigate
the negative impact of the pandemic. We focus on the extraordinary spending mix presented in
Table 1 above. Figure 2 compares the dynamic responses of the key macroeconomic variables
under the two public financing scenarios. In particular, the scenarios in which the national
deficits are financed via market-held public debt and where the national deficits are financed
via EU institutions. These are labelled as "Market-bonds financed" and "EU-bonds financed"
respectively. For comparability, we also present results from the scenario in which there is no
policy response at the national and supra-national level; this is labelled as "No response".
In terms of the key macroeconomic variables, an EU bond purchasing programme can signifi-
cantly mitigate the negative effect on consumption and investment in the short and medium run.
This could suppress the initial reduction in output and ultimately allows for a quicker recovery
13We have also examine the case in which the Government increases cash transfers and labour income loss
subisidies targeted to Savers. However, our results suggests that these extraordinary fiscal instruments are not
effi cient in terms of aggregate output. The economic logic is that Savers have other sources of income, such as
access to domestic and international financial markets, thus it is expected that these fiscal measures will not affect
their consumption plans in the short run. To save space we exclude these results from Table 1.
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in the medium run. As expected, on the fiscal side, financing the emerging deficits via the less
costly EU bond holdings allows extra fiscal space for the member state in the short and medium
run. Thus, the rise in the deficit and public debt is far less prolonged in this case.
Figure 2: National fiscal package and public financing scenarios
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Notes: see Figure 1.
Borrowing from EU institutions leads to a smaller rise in market held public debt in the
short run while it also keeps public debt in the medium/longer run at low levels despite the
increase in national deficits. EU held public debt absorbs the temporary fiscal imbalances and
thus stabilizes domestic public finances in the medium/longer run.
Lower public debt issued in private markets subsequently leads to lower real interest rates.
Since the latter affects households’ economic decisions, it makes national extraordinary fiscal
measures more effective by crowding out less investment and consumption. In turn, the milder
reduction in consumption and investment leads to a faster recovery in hours worked. Thus,
labour and capital incomes of households experience a smaller decline which creates a further
positive feedback loop on output.
This results in a milder reduction in the associated tax bases, resulting in a lower rise in the
national deficit across all time horizons. The combined effect of a lower rise in interest rates
and a smaller decline in the tax revenues leads to a smaller rise in the national deficit. Overall,
the EU bond holdings can play a role of foreign financial capital flows in the resource constraint
of the small open economy (i.e. the balance of payments) which can help the member state
economy to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic.
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7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to key structural and policy para-
meters of the model. To save space, we selectively report some key results only (a full set of
results is available upon request). First, we experiment with the parameter that governs the
sensitivity of the nominal interest at which Ireland borrows from the private markets, i.e. ψd, in
equation (3). We experiment with values 0.005 < ψd < 0.025, where the lower and upper bounds
correspond to the estimated value that we find using Irish data over the period 2000-2008 and
2000-2019 respectively. This analysis indicates that the larger is the parameter, ψd, the greater
the importance of EU institutions intervention in mitigating the pandemic effects. Second, we
experiment with the parameters in EU institutions reaction function, equation (9), that governs




. As expected, the
timing and the size of EU intervention matters, i.e. the longer the period and the larger the size
of the EU government bonds purchasing programme the larger the effect on the member state
output. We also study a relatively more conventional EU policy intervention. In particular, EU
policy institutions cut the policy rate, Q∗t , which leads to a reduction in the interest rate paid
on sovereign bonds in private markets. The latter scenario mimics an ECB interest rate cut.
We report that results and the mechanisms at work under this scenario are very similar to ones
reported in section 3.2. However interest rate policy are always constrained by the effective zero
lower bound. Finally, we simulate scenarios in which the emerging deficits are financed via mixed
public financing schemes, i.e. borrowing from both private markets and EU institutions while the
national fiscal authorities implement fiscal adjustments in the medium run. The latter implies
switching on the feedback policy coeffi cients, γf , in the associated fiscal rules in equation (8). We
experiment with fiscal adjustments involving tax raises and/or conventional spending decreases
to bring public debt down. We report that our main qualitative and quantitative results do not
change.
8 Conclusions
As with most western economies, both the impact of the Covid-19 virus itself and the measures
taken by the public authorities to counter the spread of the virus will have a dramatic and
negative impact on the Irish economy. Like a number of similar exercises, we model the impact
of the virus with a standard SOE-DSGE model with both demand and supply-side shocks. Given
the small open nature of the Irish economy, there is also a substantial impact through a trade
channel. In simulating the impact of the shock, we assume two potential outcomes, (i) a v-shaped
recovery where the containment measures succeed in containing the virus within a short period
of time and (ii) a long-lasting recovery, where the supply and demand effects of the pandemic
will endure for a relatively longer period.
Our modelling results indicate that an EU bond purchasing programme significantly mitigates
the negative effect of the virus-related shock on consumption and investment in the short and
medium run. As a result, the impact on economic output is also reduced with a quicker recovery
being facilitated in the medium run. Under our policy experiment, the ability of a member state
to finance part of the emerging deficit via less costly EU bond holdings, does result in extra fiscal
space for the domestic authorities in the short and medium run. This reduces the subsequent
increase in the deficit and public debt than would otherwise be the case.
In light of the policy measures announced to date, it is fair to say that EU institutions have
committed to play a more expansive role in dealing with the present crisis then in previous
cases. In order to maximise the effi ciency of this support, it is important to be able to quantify
14
the impact of this greater involvement on both member state’s key fiscal variables and growth
outlooks. We believe our paper makes a significant contribution in that regard.
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B.1 Ricardian households (Savers)
Each Ricardian household r maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility, V r0 , in any given
period t :









































subject to the sequential budget constraint in period t and the laws of motion of capital:
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Each household r maximizes its lifetime utility (13) in any given period t by choosing pur-
chases of the final consumption good, crt , hours of work in the tradable, l
H,r
t , non-tradable sector,
lNT,rt , and public sector, l
P,r
t , the end-of-period physical capital stocks, k
H,r
t , and k
NT,r
t , the end-
of-period holdings of domestic government bond, brt , and international traded assets expressed
in foreign currency, f∗rt , subject to the constraint (15) (in which we incorporate constraints (16)
and (17)).
The Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (15) is Λrt . The first-order conditions






























































































































B.2 Non-Ricardian Households (Non-savers)







t to maximize its expected discounted lifetime utility, V
nr
0 :




















subject to the sequential budget constraint in period t (in nominal terms):
















































Each household nr maximizes its lifetime utility (26) in any given period t by choosing
purchases of the final good, cnrt , hours of work in the tradable, l
H,nr
t , non-tradable sector, l
NT,nr
t ,
and public sector, lP,nrt subject to the constraint (27). The Lagrange multiplier associated with































= Λnrt (1− τnt )wPt φPt (31)
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C Firms
The production sector of the economy is identical to that in Varthalitis (2019). We briefly
summarize the structure of the production sector in our model and, where necessary, we refer to
the relevant sections in Varthalitis (2019).
There are two stages of private production. In the final stage, the final good that is used
for private and public consumption and investment is produced. There are two firms namely
a final good and a composite tradable good producer (the associated problems are solved in
sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 in Varthalitis (2019)). The final good producer utilizes the composite
tradable and the single intermediate non-tradable good to produce the final good. Similarly, the
composite tradable good producer utilizes the home produced tradable good and the imported
good to produce the composite tradable good.
In the intermediate stage, the intermediate non-tradable and tradable bundles are produced
(the associated problems are solved in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 in Varthalitis (2019)). Non-
tradable firms hire labour and rent physical capital from households to produce differentiated
varieties of non-tradable goods. A non-tradable distributor combines all varieties into an interme-
diate non-tradable bundle. Similarly, home tradable firms hire labour and rent physical capital
from households to produce differentiated varieties of tradable goods. A tradable distributor
combines all varieties into an intermediate home tradable bundle.
D Definition of GDP
For our quantitative analysis we need to define a measure of aggregate domestic output, ygdpt .
In the present model we incorporate public employment which yields income from public wages,
thus, in order to be consistent with national accounts definitions we include the public wage bill
in the definition of aggregate domestic output following Forni et al. (2010) and Papageorgiou
(2014). Nominal GDP, Pty
gdp














t , to express several theoretical variables as GDP shares.
E National fiscal rules
The main spending-tax policy instruments react to the debt-to-GDP ratio while fiscal persistence
is captured by including an autoregressive term. For our quantitative analysis we express all
spending instruments as shares of steady state GDP, ygdp , namely, the ratio of government
consumption to GDP, sg,ct ≡
gct
ygdp




of public wages to GDP, swt ≡
gwt
ygdp




the associated fiscal rules are given by:





























































τ ct − τ c = ρc
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n ≥ 0 are feedback policy coeffi cients on public debt held in private markets to GDP ratio
while variables without time subscript denote policy target values which are set equal to their
steady state values.
F Market clearing conditions
In this section we solve for a symmetric equilibrium in per capita terms. Without loss of generality
we set N i = N j = N and νr ≡ NrN , ν
nr ≡ NnrN are Savers and Non-Savers population shares.
Below, we present the market clearing conditions by market, i.e. the final good, tradable and
non-tradable goods markets, labour markets, capital and bonds markets. In the final good market












The market clearing condition in the tradable good market yields:
yHt = y
H,d
t + xt (41)
where yH,dt ≡
Y H,dt
N and xt ≡
Xt
N denote domestic absorption the home tradable produced good



















































































F.1 The balance of payments
Combining the aggregate Ricardian household budget constraint with the government budget
constraint and substituting the definitions for profits in the tradable and non-tradable sector, the
market clearing conditions for final good, tradable and non-tradable goods, labour and capital
markets and the aggregate budget constraint of non-Ricardian households yields a dynamic
equation that governs the evolution of net foreign debt (assets). The evolution of net foreign
debt in nominal aggregate terms is given by:








































The evolution of net foreign debt in real and per capita terms is given by:






















































where small case letters denote real and per capita quantities.
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G Calibration
Table E.1: Parameter values
Parameter Implied Value Description
β 0.9588 time discount factor
σ 2 inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption
ϑg 0 substitutability/complementarity between public and private consumption
ηH 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in the tradable sector
ηNT 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in the non-tradable sector
ηP 2 inverse of Frisch labour elasticity in public sector
χH , χNT , χg 4 preference parameter related to work effort (all sectors)
δH 0.071 capital depreciation rate in the tradable sector
δNT 0.051 capital depreciation rate in the non-tradable sector
δg 0.0741 capital depreciation rate in the public sector
aH 0.571 share of physical capital in the tradable sector
aNT 0.244 share of physical capital in the non-tradable sector
ag1 0.183 share of public capital in the public sector
ag2 0.542 share of public labour in the public sector
κH 0.035 public capital elasticity in the production function (tradable)
κNT 0.035 public capital elasticity in the production function (non-tradable)
εH 11 price elasticity of demand in the tradable sector
εNT 3.5 price elasticity of demand in the non-tradable sector
ν 0.5817 share of tradable in the production of the final good
νH 0.03 share of domestic tradable in the production of the composite tradable good
ζ 0.5 elasticity of substitution between the composite tradable and the non-tradable good
ζH 1 elasticity of substitution between domestic tradable and imported good
νr 0.7 total population share of "Savers"
νnr 0.3 total population share of "non-Savers"
λg 0.5 share of public debt held by foreign investors
AH , ANT , Ag 1 productivity/scale parameter(s) (all sectors)
FM 0.6 market-held debt to GDP threshold value
H Decentralized Equilibrium








































































































t , deft, Q
∗
t satisfying the following 62 equations, given the discretionary extraordi-



























































































































































= Λnrt (1− τnt )wPt φPt (58)
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+νrτ cash,rt + ν























































































































































































































































































































τ ct − τ c = ρc
(































deft ≡ (Rt−1 − 1)λgt−1
1
Πt







fMt−1 + gt + g
covid
t − τ t (106)


















I The cumulative output loss
In this Appendix we compute the present value of the cumulative output loss under the two
public financing scenarios discussed in section 5.1. The present value cumulative reduction in






















where ygdp,EUt and y
gdp




and Πt+i+1Rt+i are the associated dynamic discount factors respectively.
Table G.1.: Present value of cumulative output recession







ght -15.56% -12.58% +2.98%
τ cash,nrt -16.41% -13.92% +2.49%
τ covid,nrt -16.64% -13.87% +2.77%
Spending mix -16.4% -12.3% +4.1%
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